Abstract-In this contribution, the performance of an uplink CDMA system is analyzed in the context of frequency selective fading channels. Using game theoretic tools, a useful framework is provided in order to determine the optimal power allocation when users know only their own channel (while perfect channel state information is assumed at the base station). We consider the realistic case of frequency selective channels. This scenario illustrates the case of decentralized schemes and aims at reducing the downlink signaling overhead. Various receivers are considered, namely the Matched filter, the MMSE filter and the optimum filter. The goal of this paper is to derive simple expressions for the non-cooperative Nash equilibrium as the number of mobiles becomes large. To that end we combine two asymptotic methodologies. The first is asymptotic random matrix theory which allows us to obtain explicit expressions for the impact of all other mobiles on any given tagged mobile. The second is the theory of non-atomic games along with the Wardrop equilibrium concept which allows us to compute good approximations of the Nash equilibrium as the number of mobiles grow.
I. INTRODUCTION Power allocation (PA) is an important topic in the context of Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) systems, in the uplink as well as in the downlink. In particular, in the uplink, users need to transmit with enough power to achieve their requested quality of service, and not more, in order to minimize the amount of interference caused to other users. Thus, an efficient PA mechanism allows to prevent an excessive consumption of the limited ressources of the users.
Usual PA mechanisms are based on a centralized procedure, with the base station receiving training sequences from the users and signaling back the optimal power allocation for each user, possibly according to some rule of precedence [1] . However, this involves a non negligible overhead and numerous non informational transmissions.
A way to avoid the constraints of a centralized procedure is to implement a decentralized one where each user takes a decision on the transmission power. This is, for example, the case in ad-hoc networks applications. In this context, a natural framework is game theory, which studies competition (as well as cooperation) between independant actors. Tools of game theory have already been frequently used as a central framework for modeling competition and cooperation in networking, see for example [2] and references therein.
In the case of fading multiple-access channels, a game theoretic framework has already been proposed in [3] . Users compete with rates as utility and powers as moves in the game. However, their results rely on the fact that each user has a complete knowledge of the system, and in particular, perfect channel state information (CSI) of all users in the cell. This is a necessary requirement in order to use the theory of games of complete information, and a usual assumption in many papers in the field, as the authors point out. Nevertheless, it is rarely possible in practice and one can usually only satisfy at best the requirements knowing only its own channel.
When one knows only its own channel, other designs may be introduced. In [4] , defining the utility as the ratio of the throughput to the transmission power, the authors obtain results of existence and unicity of a Nash equilibrium in this hypothesis. As far as the attenuation is concerned, only flat fading is considered in [4] and in [5] , in the case of multiple carriers (each one being flat fading). However, wireless transmissions generally suffer from the effect of multiple paths, thus becoming frequency-selective. The goal of this paper is to determine the influence of the number of paths (or the selectivity of the channel) on the performance of PA. This work is an extension of [4] in the case of frequency-selective fading, in the framework of asymptotic CDMA with a cyclic prefix. We do not consider multiple carriers, as in [5] , and the results are very different to those obtained in this work. The extension is not trivial and involves advanced results on random matrices with non-equal variances due to Girko [6] whereas classical results rely on the work of Silverstein [7] .
In particular, we quantify the gain of the non-uniform PA with respect to uniform PA, according to the number of paths. The originality of the paper lies in the fact that we show that as the number of paths increases, the optimal PA becomes more and more uniform due to the ergodic behavior of all the CDMA channels. This is reminiscent of an effect ("channel hardening") already revealed in MIMO [8] . The highest gain (in terms of utility) is obtained in the case of flat fading (which also favors dis-uniform power allocation between the users).
In order to obtain analytical expressions, we consider the system in an asymptotic setting, letting both the number of users and the spreading factor tend to infinity with a fixed ratio. We use tools of random matrix theory [9] to analyze the system in this limit. Random matrix theory is a field of mathematical physics that has been recently applied to wireless communications to analyze various measures of interest such as capacity or Signal to Interference plus Noise Ratio (SINR). Interestingly, it enables to single out the main parameters of interest that determine the performance in numerous models of communication systems [10] , [11] . In addition, these asymptotic results provide good approximations for the practical finite size case, as shown by simulations.
In the asymptotic regime, the non-cooperative game becomes a non-atomic one, in which the impact (through interference) of any single mobile on the performance of other mobiles is negligible. In the networking game context, the related solution concept is often called Wardrop equilibrium [12] . The primary application of Wardrop equilibrium concerns road traffic and flows over a network. It is often much easier to compute than the original Nash equilibrium [2] , and yet, the former equilibrium is a good approximation for the latter, see details in [13] .
The layout of this paper is the following. First we introduce useful notations and concepts of random matrix theory in Sec. II, and our communication model in Sec. III. Asymptotic SINR and capacity expressions are given in Sec. IV. The game between users is introduced and the Nash equilibrium is derived in Sec. V. Finally, theoretical results for the power allocation are derived in Sec. VI and are matched with simulations in Sec. VII.
II. NOTATIONS
The following definitions and theorem can be found in [9] and will be used in the following sections. In this section, N and K are positive integers. 
III. MODEL
We consider a single CDMA cell, i.e., inter-cell interference free case. The spreading length is denoted N. The number of users in the cell is K. The load is a = K/N. The general case of wide-band CDMA is considered where the signal transmitted by user k has complex envelope Xk (t) = 1SknVk (t -nT). n Vk (t) is an weighted sum of elementary modulation pulses which satisfy the Nyquist criterion with respect to the chip interval T, (T = NTJ):
The signal is transmitted over a frequency selective channel with impulse response ck (T). Under the assumption of slowlyvarying fading, the continuous time received signal y(t) at the base station has the form:
where n(t) is zero-mean complex white Gaussian noise v variance a2. The signal (after pulse matched filtering b*(-t)) is sampled at the chip rate to get a discrete-ti signal that has the form: K
where Ck are N x N Toeplitz matrices representing frequency selective fading for the k-th user and n is N x 1 Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) vector v covariance matrix a2IN Since the users are supposed to be synchronized with base station and for sake of simplicity, we will consider all the following that users add a cyclic prefix of len equal to the channel impulse response length to their cl sequence.2 This case is similar to uplink MC-CDMA [I [16] and as a consequence, {Ck} becomes circulant [17] (4) is also valid for the case of uplink DS-CDMA since all Toeplitz matrices can be asymptotically diagonalized in a Fourier Basis [14] , [19] .
2Note that in the asymptotic case (when N -* oc), the result holds without the need of a cyclic prefix as long as the channel is absolutely summable [14] .
In the following, we will assume that the frequency selective fading matrix H behaves ergodically, as in Def. 3. The two-
. f is the frequency index and x is the user index. This enables us to use Th. 1 in order to obtain expressions for the SINR.
IV. ASYMPTOTIC SINR EXPRESSIONS
Let hk be the k-th column of H, and H(-k) be H with hk removed. Similarly, let wk be the k-th column of W, and W(-k) be W with wk removed. Let \ P( k) be v/P with the k-th column and line removed. Finally, let G(-k)
Supposing perfect CSI at the receiver, the matched filter for the k-th user is given by gk = (hk Pk wk). Denoting SJNRk =Q/k, we observe that Plk~~- (6) 1k-1k-From Prop. 2, we have the capacity of user k CNISE NIog2(l+Q).
The global capacity of the system is CMISE j log2(1 + 3(x))dx. (7) C. Optimal Filter
The term optimal filter designates a filter capable of decoding the received signal at the bound given by Shannon's capacity. Hence it is difficult to define an SINR associated to it. However, results of random matrix theory can still be applied. 
where v is the empirical eigenvalue distribution of yyH, as in Def. 2. If we differentiate the asymptotic value COPT of (9) with respect to c72, we obtain 2 0log2(e)
Assuming perfect cancellation of decoded users, successive interference cancellation with MMSE filter achieves the optimum capacity [20] . The following proposition ensues from this fact. Proposition 4: [11] As N, K -> oc with K/N -> a, the optimal capacity is given by: Prop. 4 enables us to extract an expression that is analog to the SINR for the optimal filter. This expression obeys the property Pk ak = Qk.
V. UTILITY AND NASH EQUILIBRIUM
From now on, we denote SINRk = 3k, whichever filter is actually used. In order to place ourselves in a game theoretic setting, we have to define a utility for the users. Utility measures the gain of a user as a result of the strategy this user plays. The strategy for a mobile is its power allocation. As in [4] , it is natural to define utility as the ratio of some measure of performance ai and the transmit power. For example, in the simulations, we consider the goodput a (13k) = (1 -e-k ) [21] , [4] where M is the number of bits transmitted in a CDMA packet (e.g., M = 100 in the simulations). This is a relevant performance measure, as each mobile wants to use its (limited) battery power to ensure that the maximum possible amount of information is correctly decoded at the receiver. Therefore, the utility of user k can be written pYk Uk _l (10) 
where m>(.) is the the Stieltjes transform of the empirical eigenvalue distribution of yyH. From Th. 1, ml (.) is given by This utility is expressed in bits per joule. In the non-cooperative game setting, all users transmit concurrently. The purpose of each user is to selfishly maximize its utility. A Nash equilibrium is obtained when no user can benefit by unilaterally deviating from its strategy.
We denote k= -y(3k), where y() is the same function for all users. To obtain the maximum utility achievable by user k, we differentiate Uk with respect to the power Pk and equate to 0. We obtain For all filters under consideration, (5), (6) and (13) (16) is guaranteed as long as the function y() is a quasiconcave function of the SINR, i.e., there exists a point below which the function is non-decreasing, and above which the function is 13k-.' (13k ) -. (13k ) = 0 -non-increasing [21] . In addition, we assume that the function y() takes value -y(O) = 0, so that users cannot achieve an infinite utility by not transmitting. This occurs for several functions y() of interest, in particular the goodput [21] , [4] , which we will use for simulations.
It is not interesting to consider the capacity as a function -() in the utility. It would lead to the trivial result /3* = 0, meaning that the Nash equilibrium is achieved when mobiles never transmit. The uniqueness of the solution 4* to (16) is due to fact that the SINR of each user is a strictly increasing function of its transmit power. Given the target SINR /3*, we obtain the strategy of users in the next section.
VI. POWER ALLOCATION IN THE NASH EQUILIBRIUM A. Flat Fading
In this subsection, we show that the results of [4] for Matched and MMSE filters are a special case of our setting when L = 1 (flat fading case). In addition, we derive the power allocation for the Optimum filter. When there is only one path, for each user k, denoted by its index k = x C [, a], h(f, x) does not depend on f. Given the target SINR /3*, we have explicit expressions of the power with which user k transmits for the various receivers.
The Wardrop equilibrium arises naturally when the game is considered to be played by infinitely many users, so that each user has a negligible effect on the global equilibrium. Wardrop's principle states that The journey times in all routes actually used are equal and less than those which would be experienced by a single vehicle on any unused route. In our setting, we interpret this principle in the following way: The power allocation of one user does not depend on the power allocation of the others. We thus show that in the asymptotic limit, we obtain that the strategy used by each user does not influence the strategy of other users. 1) Matchedfilter: From Prop. 1, the continuous formulation is P(x) * (72 + fg P(y) h(y) 2 dy) h(X) 2 or equivalently in a discrete form /3(72+kzYiK P~j hj 2) h k (=l p2) (17) Summing (17) (20) Both (18) and (20) are the same results as in [4] .
3) Optimum filter: In the case of the optimum filter, the SINR is not defined. However, the target capacity is the same as for the other receivers, i.e., C* = log2 (1 +/3*).
Proposition 5 suppose that hf (x) has mean zero, and the distributions of the real part and imaginary part of h (x) are even functions, as for example the Gaussian distribution, which we consider in the simulations. h(f, x) depends on f through h(f, x) = EL h (x)e-27if(-1). Given the target SINR P*, the Nash equilibrium power allocation is determined by implicit equations for the various receivers. 1) Matchedfilter: The continuous formulation is
The problem with this expression is that the power allocation of user k seems to depend on the power allocation and fading realization of all the other users. In order to alleviate this dependancy, we suppose that the number of users tends to infinity. Supposing that N z 1 pj h j2 is asymptotically a constant, denoted X, we obtain
where Ej = ZNEN= 1 h j|2 As K -> oc, we can apply the Central Limit Theorem to the sum of random variables
J1=1
It tends to its expectation, which is equal to 1 (see Appendix).
It follows that asymptotically X = 1 0* (and simulations in Sec. VII prove that this approximation is valid for moderate finite values of N). From (23), we obtain a formula similar to (18) It follows that asymptotically X = 1 c5
, we obtain a formula similar to (20) 
Ek /3*'
3) Optimum filter: In the case of the optimum filter, the SINR is not defined. However, for a given /3*, the capacity is the same as for the other receivers, i.e., C = a log2 (1 + /3*). 
1±8+
(32) Proof: The proof is similar to the proof of Prop. 5. U We observe that for all filters considered, the optimal PA is a constant times the inverse of the total energy of the channel Ej. Via Parseval's Theorem, E. Ze1h4() 2 It is a sum of i.i.d. random variables. As the number of paths increases, the optimal PA tends to a uniform PA. This is an effect similar to "channel hardening" [8] : as the number of paths increases, the variance of the distribution of the channel energy decreases and the Nash equilibrium PA becomes more and more uniform for all users.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We consider a CDMA system with K = 32 users and a spreading factor N = 256. The noise variance is o2 = io-10.
For a number of bits in a CDMA packet M = 100, the goodput is 'y(/3) (1 c8)100 (see [4] ), and /3* 6.48.
The capacity achieved at the Nash Equilibrium is C = a log2 (1 + /3*) = 0.39 bits/s. Unfortunately, the capacity itself cannot be used as a relevant performance measure in the definition of the utility, because in this case the maximal utility is obtained when not sending.
We have performed simulations over 10000 realizations. Fig. 1 shows the good fit of theoretic values calculated directly from (26), (30) and (31) with those simulations. We see that optimum filter requires the minimal power, and matched filter the maximal power to achieve the required BER.
In Fig. 2 we have plotted the average utility versus the number of multipaths L. Multipaths are supposed to be i.i.d. Rayleigh distributed with variance 1/L, in order for the channels to have the same energy. Two cases are considered: the utility obtained in the Nash equilibrium, according to the PA given by (23) and (28), and the utility in the case where all nodes transmit at the same power. In order to compare, the sum of the uniform powers is equal to the sum of the powers used in the Nash equilibrium. The utility does not vary with L in the Nash equilibrium: the Central Limit Theorem applies to the utility, which is a constant times the random variable Ek in the Nash equilibrium. The utility with uniform powers is always inferior to the utility in the Nash equilibrium. However, as L increases, the gap decreases, as the variance of Ek decreases, and the equilibrium PA becomes uniform.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Using tools of random matrices, we have derived the equilibrium power allocation in a game-theoretic framework applied to asymptotic CDMA with cyclic prefix, under frequency-selective fading. Three receivers are considered: matched filter, MMSE and optimum filter (given by Shannon's capacity). For each user, this power allocation depends only on Using p(f, x) = P(x) h(f, X) 2, (6) The proof is adapted from [11] . Notice tt CPT= 0, CMMSE = 0 and 3(x) = 0. Thu prove that the derivatives of either side of (37) In the left-hand side of (38), P(y) is given by a MMSE power allocation similar to the one given by (20) . Hence, the term f0 P(y) lh(y) 2 dy in (38) does not depend on the actual realizations of the channels. Replacing Q* by Q+ in (19) , we obtain that f P(y) h(y) l2dy 12o , which gives us (22). Replacing Q* by + in (20) , we obtain the power allocation (21 
